Spontaneous reporting systems (SRSs) have been widely established to collect adverse drug events (ADEs) for ADR detection and analysis. Usually, SRS data contain sensitive personal health information that should be protected to prevent the identification of individuals, raising the need of anonymizing the raw data before being published, namely privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) [1] . Although much work has been done on PPDP, very few studies have focused on protecting privacy of SRS data and none of the anonymization methods is favorable for SRS datasets, due to which contain some characteristics, including rare events, multiple individual records, and multivalued sensitive attributes [2].
MOTIVATION
Spontaneous reporting systems (SRSs) have been widely established to collect adverse drug events (ADEs) for ADR detection and analysis. Usually, SRS data contain sensitive personal health information that should be protected to prevent the identification of individuals, raising the need of anonymizing the raw data before being published, namely privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) [1] . Although much work has been done on PPDP, very few studies have focused on protecting privacy of SRS data and none of the anonymization methods is favorable for SRS datasets, due to which contain some characteristics, including rare events, multiple individual records, and multivalued sensitive attributes [2] .
PROPOSED METHOD
We propose a new privacy-preserving model, called MS(k, *)-bounding, which allows multiple confidence bounding specified for various sensitive values and ensures that (1) Every QID-group contains at least k distinct individuals (cases); (2) The confidence to infer any QID-group q having a sensitive value s i is
We also propose an anonymization algorithm for sanitizing the raw data to meet the requirements specified through the proposed model. Our algorithm is a hybrid of greedy and clustering approaches. Each QID-group (cluster) begins with a randomly selected record, and then is gradually increased by adding an isolated record that exhibits the best characteristic, measured by two designed metrics, called Information Loss (IL) and Privacy Risk (PR), among all candidates. This process continues until the group is composed of k different cases. Finally, the QIDs of all records belonging to the same cluster are generalized to the same value. We use generalization rather than suppression to avoid removing records corresponding to rare events.
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
Empirical study was conducted using FAERS 2010Q1 dataset [3] , with {Weight, Age, Gender} as QID, caseID as individual identifier, and INDI_PT (indications of the patient before treatment) as SA. Our method was compared with two prevailing PPDP methods, k-anonymity and l-diversity. The obtained results show that l-diversity is better than k-anonymity at protecting sensitive values. With various thresholds of attacker's inferring confidence ranging from 30% to 70%, the privacy risk incurred by l-diversity is less than 5% most of the time, around half of that by k-anonymity. On the other hand, l-diversity yields enormous amounts of information loss, over 30 times of that by k-anonymity.
When  * is set correctly (in this case it is 0.3), our method can successively prevent the disclosure of sensitive values (nearly all observed PRs are zeros) without sacrificing too much of data utility. Even for extremely improper settings of  * (in this case it is 1, meaning no restriction on the privacy disclosure), the quality of anonymized data generated by our method is comparable with that by k-anonymity. Besides, the experiments conducted on selected ADR signals from MedWatch [4] show that only very small difference on signal strength (PRR and ROR) ranging from -0.06 to 0.1 were observed, which nearly can be ignored. These observations reveal that our method can effectively solve the privacy problem in SRS data sets without overlooking rare events and influencing the ADR signal strength. 
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